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The present paper aims to quantify the welfare effects of progressive pension arrangements in 
Germany. Starting from a purely contribution-related benefit system, we introduce basic 
allowances for contributions and a flat benefit fraction. Since our overlapping-generations 
model takes into account variable labor supply, borrowing constraints as well as stochastic 
income risk, we can compare the labor supply, the liquidity, and the insurance effects of the 
policy reform. Our simulations indicate that for a realistic parameter combination an increase 
in pension progressivity would yield an aggregate efficiency gain of more than 2 percent of 
resources. However, such a reform would not be implemented because it would not find 
political support of the currently living generations. 
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Since Fenge (1995) it is a standard result in the literature that an intragenerational fair
pay-as-you-go pension system is Pareto-eﬃcient. If individual beneﬁts are proportional
to former contributions the replacement ratios are constant across income levels and the
implicit tax share of the contribution which distorts individual labor supply is minimized,
see Sinn (2000). If the link between contributions and beneﬁts is reduced or even destroy-
ed, the implicit tax share of the contribution rises up to 100 percent and, consequently,
distortions will increase. For Germany which operates a strictly contribution-related sy-
stem, some numerical simulations indicate that the eﬃciency losses from a ﬂat-rate beneﬁt
system would be quite substantial, see Fehr (2000). While countries such as Germany,
Italy or Spain traditionally operate an intergenerational fair system, other countries such
as Japan, US or UK apply a progressive system where the replacement ratios fall with
increasing income levels. In order to explain this diversity in the redistributive structure
of observed pension systems, Casamatta et al. (2000) as well as Conde-Ruiz and Galasso
(2005) apply political-economy models, where the progressivity is determined by the vo-
ting outcome. The present paper oﬀers a diﬀerent explanation. In the following we will
argue that a progressive pension system might be optimal if not only the labor market
distortions but also the risk-sharing implications are taken into consideration.
The risk-sharing characteristics of alternative tax and social security arrangements ha-
ve recently gained increasing attention among economists. Kr¨ uger and Kubler (2005)
show that the introduction of an unfunded social security system can lead to a Pareto-
improvement in a model with stochastic production shocks if markets are incomplete and
households are fairly risk-avers. Matsen and Thøgersen (2004) derive the optimal mix
between funded and unfunded pension saving in a portfolio choice model with wage inco-
me, demographic and stock market risk. The adjustment of the pay-go pension budget,
on the other hand, determines the intergenerational allocation of such macroeconomic
shocks. Thøgersen (1998) as well as Wagener (2003, 2004) demonstrate that a constant
contribution rate shifts future economic risks mainly to pensioners while a constant re-
placement ratio would shift economic risks upon contributors.
Of course, the applied “pension formula” is not only an important intergenerational risk-
sharing device for aggregate shocks, it also might provide an insurance for idiosyncratic
shocks. If beneﬁts are strongly linked to former contributions, individual labor income
ﬂuctuations are carried to the retirement period. On the contrary, a ﬂat-rate beneﬁt sy-
stem could be interpreted as an intragenerational risk-sharing device for individual labor
income shocks. Since the insurance and the labor supply eﬀect work in opposite direc-
1tions, it is a quantitative question which one dominates the other. Our study aims to
quantify the resulting eﬃciency consequences of a reform to a more progressive pensi-
on system in Germany. The numerical analysis is based on an overlapping generations
model in the Auerbach-Kotlikoﬀ (1987) tradition. It extends earlier work (Fehr, 2000)
by including labor income risk, life-span uncertainty and borrowing constraints. We ﬁnd
that, in contrast to the previous study, a move towards a more progressive pension system
yields a potential Pareto-improvement. For our base case parameter choice, the aggregate
eﬃciency gains increase up to 2.13 percent of initial resources.
Since we quantify welfare and eﬃciency eﬀects of a policy reform, our study can be com-
pared with various other recent numerical papers with idiosyncratic income risk. Huggett
and Ventura (1999) quantify the distributional consequences if the current pension sy-
stem in the US would be substituted by a two-tire system which was proposed by Boskin
et al. (1986). Whereas the ﬁrst tire is strictly connected to former contributions, the
tax-ﬁnanced second tier would guarantee a minimum pension for all households with low
income. Their simulations suggest that such a reform would result in welfare losses for
the US. However, the analysis is restricted to the steady state, which makes it diﬃcult
to interpret their distributional ﬁndings. Støresletten et al. (1999) consider the long run
eﬀects when the current US pension system is either replaced by a two-tier system of
personal saving accounts or completely eliminated. In contrast to Huggett and Ventura
(1999), their two-tire system delivers a welfare gain, which is even larger than the gain
from privatization. Since their model does not include a labor-leisure choice, the welfare
gains are mainly due to general equilibrium eﬀects. The latter are in favor of future gene-
rations although the authors try to neutralize the intergenerational income redistribution
implied by the reforms.
Huang et al. (1997) were the ﬁrst who study alternative transition paths of social security
privatization in a model with ﬁxed labor supply and idiosyncratic endowment shocks.
Whereas in the ﬁrst experiment social security is terminated immediately and entitled
generations are compensated with government bonds, the pension system is phased-out
in the second and the government builds up a capital stock to pay for social security
retirement beneﬁts in later years. The eﬃciency gains are larger in the latter experiment
which is according to the authors due to the improved public provision of insurance against
life span risk and labor income volatility. De Nardi et al. (1999) extend this model
by including realistic US demographics and variable labor supply. The latter allows to
analyze reforms where the tax-beneﬁt linkage of the pension system is improved, which
increases welfare in their framework. Similarly, Conesa and Krueger (1999) extend the
Huang et al. (1997) framework by including variable labor supply and idiosyncratic
2eﬃciency (not endowment) shocks. They simulate an immediate, a gradually and an
announced elimination of the pension system and compute the political support for the
three proposals. Although for all cases of intra-cohort heterogeneity agents would prefer
to be born into the ﬁnal steady-state, no proposal receives an initial voting majority. Due
to the assumed ﬂat pensions in the initial steady-state, the redistribution of the system
is abolished if privatization is implemented. Therefore, political support is declining if
intra-cohort heterogeneity is increasing.
While Conessa and Krueger (1999) can explain why pension reforms are delayed in de-
mocratic systems, their study does not include eﬃciency calculations. The latter is in
the center of our interest. Our approach follows Smetters and Nishiyama (2003) who
analyze similar as Conesa and Krueger (2005) a revenue-neutral reform from income to
consumption taxation in the US in an OLG model with stochastic labor productivity. The
considered reform reduces the labor supply distortions but also the insurance provision of
the tax system. Similar as in Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ (1987) agents are compensated along
the transition path and the positive (in the case of overall eﬃciency gains) or negative
(in the case of overall eﬃciency losses) assets of the Lump-Sum Redistribution Authority
are distributed to newborn agents. The present study also follows this approach but in
addition also isolates the insurance and labor supply eﬀects numerically.
In the next section, we discuss the general idea of our simulations in a simple framework.
Then we describe in brief the German pension system and sketch the structure of the
simulation model in section 3. Section 4 explains the calibration and simulation approach.
Finally, section 5 presents the simulation results and section 6 oﬀers some concluding
remarks.
2 The optimal progressivity of pension systems
Table 1 compares the level and the progressivity of diﬀerent pension systems within the
OECD. The progressivity is indicated by the change in the net replacement rates across
income levels. Note that in Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Poland and Spain replacement
rates are almost constant. All other countries operate a progressive pension system,
where a fraction of retirement income consists of ﬂat-rate beneﬁts. Consequently, the net
replacement ratios are falling when income levels increase. But replacement rates alone
could be misleading as a measure of progressivity. In the UK and Ireland the pension
system is progressive on the expenditure and the contribution side. The latter is due
to the basic contribution allowance which amounts to 22.8 and 55.4 percent of average
income in the UK and Ireland, respectively. In Germany social security contribution rates
3Tabelle 1: Cross country pension levels and progressivity
Net replacement rates by Basic
individual earnings level allowance
Multiple of average in % of
0.5 1.0 2.0 average wage
Australia 77.0 52.4 36.5 –
France 98.0 68.8 59.2 –
Germany 61.7 71.8 67.0 10.0a
Ireland 63.0 36.6 21.9 55.4
Italy 89.3 88.8 89.1 –
Japan 80.1 59.1 44.3 –
Netherlands 82.5 84.1 83.8 –
Poland 69.6 69.7 70.5 –
Spain 88.7 88.3 83.4 –
UK 78.4 47.6 29.8 22.8
USA 61.4 51.0 39.0 –
OECD average 84.9 69.1 61.4 –
Source: OECD (2005), Meister and Ochel (2005).
a currently proposed
are reduced if the annual income is below 14.2 percent of average income. However, if
the annual income passes this threshold, contribution rates are phased-in again so that
ﬁnally one has to pay normal contribution rates on the full income. Recently the German
trade unions have proposed a reform towards a system of basic allowances which would
amount to 10 percent of average income1.
In the following we ﬁrst develop the basic idea of our simulations. In the simpliﬁed
example, we consider a small open economy where the population growth rate is equal to
the world interest rate, i.e. r = n. In each period two generations of workers and retirees
coexist. Within each working generation, wage earnings wi diﬀer for each individual i
from average earnings ¯ w according to:
wi =¯ w +  i  i ∼ N(0;σ
2)
Contributions to the pension system depend on the diﬀerence between the stochastic gross
income wi and the basic allowance β ¯ w, where the latter is deﬁned as a ﬁxed fraction β
of average income. If annual income is below the basic allowance, workers even receive
transfers from the pension system. Since we keep the aggregate expenditures constant,
the contribution rate τ(β) depends on the level of the basic allowance. In order to deﬁne
1See Meister and Ochel (2005) or Bonin and Schneider (2005).
4the contribution function we assume that contributions of the average income households
are kept ﬁxed, i.e.






(1 − β)2 > 0.
When the individual retires, his pension consists of two parts: a (contributory) part which
is directly related to his former earnings wi and a (noncontributory) part which is related
to average earnings ¯ w, see Casamatta et al. (2000). Since the rate of return of the pay-go
scheme is the population growth rate we get
p(λ)=( 1+n)τ(0)[(1 − κτ(0))λ ¯ w +( 1− λ)wi]
where κ deﬁnes the distortion factor and λ is the ﬂat beneﬁt fraction of the pension. If
λ = 0 pensions are purely contributory, if λ = 1 pension beneﬁts are uniform. Although
we do not explicitly model variable labor supply in this simple example, the eﬃciency
consequences of the pension system are indirectly taken into account by κ. If the basic
allowance is zero and pensions are intragenerational fair, the system does not distort labor
supply. However, distortions increase if a basic allowance or a ﬂat beneﬁt is introduced.
Since we abstract from bequests, individual lifetime income is computed from
yi = wi − (1 + κβ)τ(β)[wi − β ¯ w]+τ(0)[(1 − κτ(0))λ ¯ w +( 1− λ)wi]
where we have substituted the assumption r = n. Expected lifetime earnings and the
respective variance are
E(y)= ¯ w[1 − κβτ(0) − κλτ(0)
2], (1)
V (y)=[ 1 − (1 + κβ)τ(β)+( 1− λ)τ(0)]
2σ
2. (2)
The central trade-oﬀ could be already observed in the above formulas: basic allowances
and ﬂat beneﬁts induce distortions and reduce the expected lifetime income. However,
since both instruments also reduce lifetime income uncertainty they both represent an
insurance against income shocks. In order to compute the optimal progressivity of the




V (y)( 3 )
where individual utility increases with expected income and decreases with the uncertainty
of income. The parameter η deﬁnes the individual risk aversion. Substituting (1) and (2)
in (3) we get




[1 − (1 + κβ)τ(β)+( 1− λ)τ(0)]
2σ
2.
5From the optimality conditions
∂U(y)
∂β





























It is easy to check that for this parameter combination the uncertainty disappears and all
households receive a (certain) lifetime income of ¯ w.2












i.e. the optimal basic allowance will be reduced if labor supply (κ) is more elastic and the
optimal share of ﬂat beneﬁts will increase if households have higher risk aversion (η)a n d
are exposed to more income risk (σ2). Labor supply elasticity has an unclear eﬀect on the
optimal share of ﬂat beneﬁts. While the direct eﬀect reduces optimal progressivity, the
indirect eﬀect (due to
∂β∗
∂κ < 0) increases it. Finally, there exists a negative relationship
between the optimal level of the basic allowance and the optimal ﬂat beneﬁt fraction, i.e.
∂λ∗
∂β∗ < 0.
This basic intuition will not change in a more complex economic environment. The next
section presents the simulation model which is applied to quantify the optimal values of
λ and β for the German pension system.
3 The model economy
3.1 Preliminaries
We consider an economy populated by overlapping generations of individuals which face
random survival up to a maximum possible lifespan of J = 16 periods, i.e. each model
2The exact value of β∗ is due to technical reasons. It is easy to check that any value of β would be
feasible since without distortions λ could always eliminate the uncertainty.
6period covers ﬁve years. In addition to lifespan uncertainty, individuals also face pro-
ductivity shocks during their working time. Labor supply is variable, but consumers are
forced to retire at the retirement age jR = 9 (i.e. real age 60). During retirement, pen-
sioners receive payroll-ﬁnanced social security beneﬁts and run down their accumulated
assets. Apart from the pension system, the government levies a progressive personal tax
on income from labor, capital and pensions and proportional taxes on consumption and
corporate proﬁts. Tax revenues are used to ﬁnance public goods and the interest payments
on public debt. The production sector comprises a constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas
production function without technological progress and no aggregate uncertainty.
The initial equilibrium of our model economy is a steady state, then the social security
reform is implemented before the individual productivity of the next period is revealed
and a new equilibrium path in the assumed closed economy is calculated. We assume
zero population growth and keep the survival probabilities constant at initial values.
Consequently, all agents face a probability sj of surviving up to age j, conditional of
surviving up to age j−1. Every age j cohort Nj is fragmented into subgroups ξj(z)w h e r e
 
z ξj(z) = 1 reﬂecting their state z at a speciﬁc age j. The state z =( epj,aj,e j)o fa n
age j agent describes the agent’s earnings points for pension claims epj, asset holdings aj
and eﬃciency ej. In the following, we concentrate on the long run equilibrium and omit
the state index z for every variable whenever possible. Agents are then only distinguished
a c c o r d i n gt ot h e i ra g ej.
3.2 The individual decision problem
Our model assumes a preference structure that is represented by a time-separable, nested
CES utility function. In order to isolate risk aversion from intertemporal substitution, we
follow the approach of Epstein and Zin (1991) and formulate the maximization problem






























where  j and cj denote leisure and consumption at age j respectively and the parameter
θ represents the “pure” rate of time preference. Since lifespan is uncertain, the expected
utility in future periods is weighted with the survival probability sj+1. Productivity ej
at each age j is uncertain and depends on the productivity in the previous period. Con-
sequently, π(ej+1|ej) denotes the probability to experience productivity ej+1 in the next
7period if the current productivity is ej. The parameters γ and η deﬁne the intertempo-
ral elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure in diﬀerent years and the
degree of (relative) risk aversion, respectively. Note that for the special case η = 1
γ we
are back at the traditional expected utility speciﬁcation, see Epstein and Zin (1991, 266).











where ρ denotes the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between consumption and
leisure at each age j. Finally, the leisure preference parameter α is assumed to be age
independent. The budget constraint is deﬁned as follows:
aj+1 =a j(1 + r)+wj(1 − τj)+pj − T(yj) − (1 + τ
c)cj + bj (6)
with a1 = aJ+1 =0a n daj ≥ 0 ∀ j. In addition to income from savings, households receive
gross labor income wj =( 1− j)we j but have to pay progressive income taxes T(yj)a n d
pension contributions τj. Due to the basic allowance and a contribution ceiling the average
contribution rate depends on income. We deﬁne the progressive tax function T(·)w h i c h
computes the income tax burden from taxable income yj. The price of consumption goods
(1 + τc) includes consumption taxes, pj is the pension payment after retirement and r
deﬁnes the gross interest rate. Since we abstract from annuity markets, agents who die
might leave positive assets. Those assets are aggregated and distributed among all cohorts
following an exogenous age-dependent distribution scheme3, where an age j agent receives
the accidental bequests bj.
The taxable income yj in (6) is derived from gross labor and capital income and (after
retirement) a fraction ψ of pension payments:
yj = wj + ψpj +m a x [ a jr − d
s;0]− dj. (7)
Households only have to tax capital income if it exceeds a certain limit ds (Sparerfrei-
betrag). In addition, they can deduct a ﬁxed work related allowance and parts of their
contributions to the pension system. The sum of individual allowances is computed in
the deduction amount dj.
3.3 The production side
The economy is populated by a large number of competitive ﬁrms, the sum of which we
normalize to unity. Aggregate output Y is produced using a Cobb-Douglas production
3The latter is computed from socio-economic panel (SOEP) data of 2001.
8technology, i.e.
Y =  K
εL
1−ε (8)
where K and L are aggregate capital and labor, ε is capital’s share in production, and  
is a technology parameter. Firms have to pay corporate taxes T k = τk 
Y − wL − δK
 
where the corporate tax rate τk of 15 percent is applied to the output net of labor costs
wL and depreciation δK.
Firms will employ labor up to the point where the marginal product of labor equals labor
costs. Similarly they will employ capital up to the point where the net marginal product
of capital is equal to the interest rate:


















In each period the government issues new debt ∆B and collects taxes and social security
contributions from households and ﬁrms in order to ﬁnance general government expendi-








k = G + rB. (11)
With respect to public debt, we assume that the government maintains an exogenously
ﬁxed debt to capital ratio. General government expenditures G consist of government
purchases of goods and services which are ﬁxed per capita. In order to balance the
budget each period, the consumption tax rate τc is adjusted.
In each year, the pension system pays old-age beneﬁts and collects payroll contributions
from wage income above the basic allowance and below the contribution ceiling. In the
initial equilibrium the basic allowance is zero while the contribution ceiling is ﬁxed at two
times the average income. Individual pension beneﬁts pj of a retiree of age j ≥ jR in
a speciﬁc year are computed from the product of his earning points epjR the retiree has
accumulated at retirement and the actual pension amount (APA) of the respective year:
pj = epjR × APA. (12)
The accumulated earning points consist of two parts: The ﬁrst part depends on the
relative income position min[wj/¯ w;2.0] of the worker at working age j<j R.S i n c e t h e
9contribution ceiling is ﬁxed at the double of average income, the maximum earning points
that could be collected are 2. The earning point of the second part is normalized to
one and therefore independent of individual income. The weights are (1 − λ)a n dλ,
respectively. Accumulated earning points at age j are therefore
epj = epj−1 +m i n [ wj/¯ w;2.0](1 − λ)+λ. (13)
The actual pension amount (APA) in equation (12) is adjusted in each period in order
to yield a standard pension (i.e. where epjR = jR − 1) which amounts to sixty percent of
net average earnings.
The budget of the pension system must be balanced in each period. Therefore, the general












min[wj(z);2.0¯ w] − β ¯ w;0
 
ξj(z)Nj. (14)
The right hand side of equation (14) shows the individual contribution base. Households
don’t pay contribution on income below the basic allowance and above the contribution
ceiling. Note that the general social security contribution rate τ which is calculated
from (14) is not necessarily identical with the individual contribution rates in the budget





0i f wj <β¯ w,
τ[wj − β ¯ w]/wj if β ¯ w ≤ wj ≤ 2.0¯ w,
τ[2.0 − β]¯ w/wj if wj > 2.0¯ w
(15)
Of course, the basic allowance and the contribution ceiling create a non convexity in the
budget constraint similar as the progressive income tax schedule. However since we model
individual pension claims as a state variable and optimize labor supply over discrete grid
points, we do not need the ﬁrst-order conditions (and the included marginal tax and
contribution rates) from the optimization problem.
4 Calibration
In order to solve the model we have to specify the income process, preference and techno-
logy parameters and tax rates. This section presents our parameter choices and describes
the initial equilibrium.
104.1 The income process
We consider six productivity proﬁles across the life cycle. The four top proﬁles are directly
taken from Fehr (1999) while the lowest proﬁle from the previous study has been split up
in order to improve the income distribution. When an agent enters the labor market (at
age 20-24) he belongs to the lowest productivity level with a probability of 10 percent, to
the second lowest again with 10 percent and to higher levels with 20 percent, respectively.
After the initial period, agents change their productivity levels according to the following
Markov transition matrix.
Tabelle 2: Markov transition matrix
Current productivity level
123456
1 0.40 0.24 0.17 0.09 0.05 0.04
2 0.17 0.35 0.33 0.09 0.04 0.02
Past 3 0.08 0.13 0.41 0.24 0.10 0.04
productivity 4 0.06 0.03 0.19 0.39 0.25 0.08
level 5 0.04 0.02 0.10 0.22 0.41 0.22
6 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.20 0.63
Source: Authors’ own calculations from 1998/2003
SOEP data
The Markov transition matrix is calculated as follows: First the primary earners in each
household of the 1998 survey are ranked according to their gross income and then divided
into six income classes. Then we rank and compute the respective income class of those
persons who are still in the survey in 2003. Finally we calculate the above reported
transition probabilities for each income class.
4.2 Preferences, technology and demographics
Table 3 reports the other important parameter values. A discussion of preference and
technology parameters can be found in Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ (1987, 52f.) or Fehr
(1999, 57). The literature typically perceives values for the coeﬃcient of relative risk
aversion between 1 and 5 as reasonable, values above 10 are considered unrealistic, see
Cecchetti et al. (2000, 792). This perception is consistent with the evidence from survey
questions, see Barski et al. (1997) for the US or Dohmen et al. (2005) for Germany.
The taxation of income (labor and capital income and pensions) is very close to the
German income tax code after the reforms in 2004. The taxable share of pensions ψ is 0.32.
11Tabelle 3: Parameter values of the model
Symbol Value
Utility function
time preference rate (p.a.) θ 0.01
intertemporal elasticity of substitution γ 0.5
intratemporal elasticity of substitution ρ 0.6
coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion η 4.0
leisure preference parameter α 1.5
Production function
technology level   1.48
capital share in production ε 0.30
economic depreciation (p.a.) δ 0.05
Employees are allowed to deduct 50 percent of their pension contributions (the employers
share) and the remaining 50 percent (i.e. the employees’ share) up to a maximum of 2000
e. We assume that our individuals are married couples with a sole wage earner and apply
the German income splitting method. For capital income there is a special allowance of
ds = 1800 e (per couple)4. Figure 1 shows the marginal tax rate schedule introduced in
Germany in 2005.
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Finally, with respect to the demographic parameters we compute average survival proba-
bilities from Bomsdorf (2003) for the ages 20 to 99.
4In Germany this allowance is 3000 e for nominal interest income, but in our model we have no
inﬂation and therefore we reduce this amount by about 40 percent.
124.3 Initial equilibrium
Table 4 reports the structure of the models initial equilibrium (where λ = β =0 )a n d
compares it with the respective actual ﬁgures for 2003. All in all, the model represents the
basic economic and ﬁscal structure of Germany quite well. Since the model is simulated
as a closed economy, the interest rate is endogenous and the trade balance is zero. The
key characteristics of the tax and pension system match the current German situation.
Tabelle 4: The initial equilibrium
Model Germany
2003∗
Expenditures on GDP (% of GDP)
private consumption 63.3 58.6
government purchases 18.9 19.3
gross investment 17.9 17.8
exports-imports – 4.3
Government indicators
aggregate pension beneﬁts (% of GDP) 13.0 12.7
pension contribution rate (in %) 19.3 19.5
Tax revenues (in % of GDP) 20.9 20.7
income tax 7.7 7.4
consumption tax 11.4 10.7
corporation tax 1.8 1.7
consumption tax rate (in %) 18.0 –
interest rate p.a. (in %) 3.1 –
capital-output ratio 3.1 3.5
*Source: Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft (2004).
Table 5 shows the distribution for net income and assets respectively. The percentage
share of income (assets) is the share that accrues to subgroups of the population ranked
by net income (assets). Our initial equilibrium replicates the German income distribution
quite well, however, it underestimates the wealth inequality5. Finally, 40 percent of labor
market entrants (i.e. the three lowest income classes) would like to borrow on the capital
market in the initial equilibrium. For the following generations this fraction falls to 9, 6,
and 1.5 percent, respectively.
5The latter is quite common in numerical models. Heer and Trede (2003, 96) point out that it might
13Tabelle 5: Income and Wealth Distribution
Percentage share of income/assets Gini
Lowest 10% Highest 10% index
Net income 3.4 22.2 0.287 Model
Assets 0.0 30.4 0.518
Net income 3.1 23.9 0.299 Germany∗
Assets 0.2 44.2 0.613
* Source: DIW (2005, 202)
This should suﬃce to explain our calibration and initial equilibrium. Next we turn to the
policy reforms and their risk and eﬃciency implications.
5 Simulation Findings
This section compares the macroeconomic and welfare consequences of a switch from the
current contribution-related to a more progressive pension system in Germany. Before
the numerical results of the simulations are presented, we ﬁrst explain the computation
of the welfare changes.
5.1 Experimental Design and Social Welfare
In order to ﬁnd the optimal values for β and λ, we increase both parameters from their
benchmark value of zero. As a consequence, the tax-beneﬁt linkage will be reduced, the
marginal contribution rate will increase, and labor market distortions will rise. But the
higher progressivity also improves the risk-sharing characteristics of the pension system.
The welfare criterion we use to assess this reform is ex-ante expected utility of an agent,
before the productivity level is revealed (i.e. looking upon her life behind the Rawlsian veil











where π1 = π2 =0 .1a n dπ3 = ··· = π6 =0 .2. From that point of view one has some
desire for redistribution, which provides insurance for being born as a low-productivity
type. Following Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ (1987, 87) we compute the proportional increase
be due to the neglected business ownership.
14in consumption and leisure (W) which would make an agent in the baseline scenario as
well oﬀ as in the reform scenario. If the expected utility level after the reform is ˆ V and
the expected utility level on the baseline path is ¯ V , the necessary increase (decrease) in









Consequently, a value of W =1 .0 indicates that this agent would need one percent more
resources in the baseline scenario to attain expected utility ˆ V .
In order to asses the aggregate eﬃciency consequences, we introduce a Lump-Sum Redis-
tribution Authority (LSRA) in the spirit of Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ (1987, 65f.) as well
as Nishiyama and Smetters (2003, 29f.). The LSRA pays a lump-sum transfer (or levies a
lump-sum tax) to each living household in the ﬁrst period of the transition to bring their
expected utility level back to the level of the initial equilibrium. Since utility depends on
age and state, these transfers (or taxes) have to be computed for every agent in period
one. Note that transfers diﬀer only between the states of the earning points epj and asset
holdings aj but not between eﬃciencies for agents with the same epj and aj.T h a t i s
because the reform is announced before the productivity shock in period 1 is revealed.
Consequently, age-j agents who already worked before the reform are compensated by the
transfers vj1(¯ V (z)), which guaranties for each individual at state z the initial expected
utility level ¯ V (z). On the other hand, those who enter the labor market in period t of
the transition receive a transfer v1t(V ∗) which guaranties them an expected utility level
V ∗. Note that the transfers v1t may diﬀer among future cohorts but the expected utility
level V ∗ is identical for all. The value of the latter is chosen by requiring that the present














∗)N1 =0 . (17)
With V ∗ > ¯ V (i.e. W>0), all households in period one who have lived in the previous
period would be as well oﬀ as before the reform and all current and future newborn
households would be strictly better oﬀ. Hence, the new policy is Pareto improving after
lump-sum redistributions. With V ∗ < ¯ V (i.e. W<0), the policy reform is Pareto inferior
after lump-sum redistributions. In order to asses the overall eﬃciency of the reform we
will report the value of W after compensation in the following tables.
155.2 Numerical Results for the Benchmark Calibration
In order to discuss the macroeconomic and long run welfare consequences, we consider in
Table 6 a scenario where half of the pension consists of ﬂat beneﬁts and the basic allowance
amounts to 30 percent of average income (i.e. λ =0 .5a n dβ =0 .3). Since this reform
reduces the tax-beneﬁt linkage and increases contributions, labor supply, employment,
consumption and GDP fall which in turn reduce aggregate savings and (one period later)
the capital stock. Initially wages increase, but due to the crowding out of capital they
fall back even below the initial level during the transition. Due to the basic allowance
contribution rates have to increase by almost 10 percent. However, since the reform only
changes the progressivity of the system, aggregate pension outlays remain almost constant
during the transition. Finally, since income tax revenues are reduced and the consumption
tax base is smaller, consumption tax rates have to increase in order to balance the budget.
Tabelle 6: Macroeconomic eﬀects of progressive pensions
Period 2005-09 2015-19 2025-29 2035-39 2045-49 2055-59 ∞
Employmenta -5.2 -4.5 -4.1 -4.1 -4.1 -4.2 -4.1
Consumptiona -3.5 -4.7 -5.2 -5.5 -5.7 -5.8 -6.0
GDPa -3.7 -4.3 -4.5 -4.7 -4.9 -5.0 -5.1
Capital stocka 0.0 -3.8 -5.5 -6.2 -6.6 -6.9 -7.4
Wagea 1.6 0.2 -0.4 -0.7 -0.8 -0.9 -1.1
Interest rate p.a.b -0.3 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2
Contribution rateb 9.6 9.5 9.3 9.1 9.3 9.6 9.8
Pension outlaysc 13.0 13.0 12.9 12.8 12.9 13.0 13.1
Consumption taxb 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.3
aChanges are reported in percentage over baseline simulation
bChanges in percentage points. cin % of GDP
Figure 2 reports the average ex-ante expected welfare changes for current and future agents
computed from (16).6 Given the negative long-run macroeconomic consequences from
Table 6, one would expect that at least all future agents are worse of with a progressive
pension system. However, this basic intuition is misleading, since it neglects the insurance
eﬀects of the reform. As Figure 2 shows, the reform clearly reduces the welfare of most
elderly households while younger and future living households gain. Due to the increase in
6Since we have to distinguish agents living in the reform year according to their current state, we
report in Figure 2 the average welfare change for each cohort.
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consumption taxes, elderly who are already retired (i.e. are born before 1940) lose up to 2
percent of remaining lifetime income. Since workers beneﬁt from the improved insurance
eﬀects, households who are born after 1960 realize increasing welfare gains which reach
a maximum for those who enter the labor market in the reform year 2005. For future
workers, welfare eﬀects are still positive but decrease again due to the long-run fall in
wages. Figure 2 also shows that the considered progressive pension reform would yield
a Pareto-improvement! If all current households are compensated with LSRA transfers,
young and future households could still experience a welfare increase which amounts to
2.13 percent of initial resources.
The upper part of Table 7 reports the compensated welfare gains for alternative levels of
the basic allowance and ﬂat-beneﬁt shares. Without a basic allowance the insurance eﬀect
always dominates the labor supply eﬀect. Consequently, the ﬁrst line shows an eﬃciency
gain which rises with the ﬂat-beneﬁt level. The introduction of basic allowances increases
the eﬃciency gains initially, since the latter not only provides an insurance, but also
reduces the liquidity constraints of some households. As already indicated in the basic
model of section 2, the basic allowance reduces the optimal share of ﬂat beneﬁts. Since
labor supply distortions are also rising with the allowance level, the highest eﬃciency gain
is computed with the combination β =0 .3a n dλ =0 .5f r o mT a b l e6a b o v e .
In order to isolate the insurance eﬀect of a speciﬁc reform, the middle part of Table 7
reports the eﬃciency consequences for risk neutral preferences (i.e. η =0 ) ,w h i c ho f
course are due to labor supply and liquidity eﬀects. In most cases the losses due to higher
labor supply distortions dominate the potential gains from improved liquidity and overall
eﬃciency declines. It should not be surprising that the eﬃciency losses are increasing
with the progressivity of the system. Finally, the insurance eﬀect of a speciﬁc reform can
17be roughly recovered from the diﬀerence between the respective ﬁgures in top and middle
part of Table 7.7
Tabelle 7: Compensated welfare changes: Benchmark∗
βλ
insurance, liquidity and labor supply eﬀect
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
0.0 0.00 0.55 0.97 1.14 1.32
0.1 0.69 1.12 1.43 1.64 1.61
0.2 1.37 1.76 2.04 2.05 2.06
0 . 31 . 7 32 . 0 0 2.13 2.04 1.73
0.4 1.75 1.84 1.77 1.46 1.05
liquidity and labor supply eﬀect
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
0.0 0.00 -0.23 -0.47 -0.78 -1.19
0.1 -0.02 -0.22 -0.51 -0.90 -1.32
0.2 0.05 -0.25 -0.58 -1.01 -1.53
0.3 -0.22 -0.57 -1.00 -1.53 -2.17
0.4 -0.84 -1.29 -1.84 -2.50 -3.29
labor supply eﬀect
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
0.0 0.00 -0.18 -0.49 -0.82 -1.24
0.1 -0.14 -0.38 -0.66 -1.06 -1.54
0.2 -0.32 -0.60 -0.96 -2.15 -1.95
0.3 -0.67 -1.04 -1.49 -2.04 -2.67
0.4 -1.38 -1.87 -2.42 -3.05 -3.82
∗In percentage of remaining resources.
Finally, we separate the labor supply and the liquidity eﬀect by removing the borrowing
constraints in the last part of Table 7. We run these simulations with risk neutral pre-
ferences. Consequently, the reported ﬁgures show the pure labor supply eﬀect, while the
diﬀerence between the respective numbers in the middle and last part of Table 7 isolate
(roughly) the liquidity eﬀect of each reform. Note ﬁrst that for β = 0 the eﬃciency gains
in the middle and last part of Table 7 are almost identical. Since with risk neutral pre-
ferences a more progressive pension system will not alter savings behavior dramatically,
the liquidity eﬀect is close to zero. On the other hand, the eﬃciency losses of the ﬁrst
column are now higher than before, since the basic allowance does not relax the borrowing
7However, one has to keep in mind that also the initial equilibria in the top and middle part slightly
diﬀer. Consequently, the percentage ﬁgures refer to diﬀerent bases.
18constraints any more (as in the upper part). Finally, note that the liquidity eﬀect rises
with β.
Given the welfare consequences of the reform for the diﬀerent households, we follow Co-
nessa and Krueger (1999, 2005) and check whether the the optimal progressivity level
λ =0 .5a n dβ =0 .3 is politically feasible. Consequently, we compute the fraction of each
cohort living in the initial equilibrium which would beneﬁt from the reform and match
these ﬁgures with the population structure in Germany in 2001. Figure 3 shows on the
left axis the fraction of the respective cohort which beneﬁts and, consequently, is in favor
of the reform. Of course, all elderly will lose and all entrants in the labor market will
gain. In the middle-age-cohort the productivity realization and the remaining time hori-
zon until retirement determines the judgement of the reform. In general high productivity
types are against the reform, whereas a long time horizon works in favor of the reform.
Consequently, at younger ages only high productivity types are against the reform while
with rising age more and more lower productivity agents join the group of opponents.
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If we combine the pro-shares of the various cohorts from Figure 3 with the German
population data, we arrive at a fraction of only 34.9 percent of total voters who will be
in favor of the reform. Consequently, we conclude for our benchmark calibration, that a
more progressive pension system would be rejected by a majority of voters, although it
yields a potential Pareto-improvement.
5.3 Sensitivity Analysis
In our benchmark calibration of Table 3, the intertemporal substitution elasticity (γ)
is fairly high, compared to the standard calibration in Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ (1987).
19Consequently, in the upper part of Table 8 we reduce this parameter to 0.25. As a
consequence, the optimal consumption proﬁle of households becomes ﬂatter. The impact
on aggregate eﬃciency is quite diﬀerent for ﬂat beneﬁts and basic allowances. If ﬂat
beneﬁts are introduced, young and poor households would like to increase their current
consumption more than in the benchmark. Consequently, the borrowing constraint bites
more than before which dampens the eﬃciency gains of ﬂat beneﬁts in the ﬁrst line of Table
8 compared to the respective ﬁgures in Table 7. On the other hand, the ﬂatter optimal
consumption proﬁle also implies that the borrowing constraints now bite stronger for
young and poor households in the initial equilibrium. Consequently, the liquidity eﬀects
of the basic allowance are stronger which increases the eﬃciency gains in the ﬁrst column
of Table 8 compared to the respective ﬁgures in Table 7.
Next we change the labor supply elasticity. The assumed intratemporal substitution
elasticity (ρ) of 0.6 from Table 3 implies in the initial equilibrium an uncompensated
wage elasticity of labor supply of -0.03 and a compensated elasticity of 0.24. The ﬁgure
for the uncompensated elasticity is in line with the empirical literature. A recent study
by Flood et al. (2003) reports estimates for uncompensated wage elasticities which range
from -0.04 to 0.15, the reported ﬁgure for Germany was 0.0. Of course, the compensated
elasticity is responsible for the computed labor supply distortions. In the middle part
of Table 8 we increase the intratemporal substitution elasticity to 0.7 which yields an
uncompensated labor supply elasticity of 0.0 and a compensated elasticity of 0.29. As
one would expect, the eﬃciency gains from pension progressivity are sharply reduced
compared to the benchmark case of Table 7. The most extreme combination in Table 8
now even yields aggregate eﬃciency losses. The optimal combination is now β =0 .2a n d
λ =0 .5, which is clearly in line with the predictions from section 2.
Finally, we alter the relative risk aversion (η) from Table 3. Although the benchmark
value of η = 4 is fairly low8, we reduce the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion further from
4 to 2 in the lower part of Table 8. Not surprisingly, the aggregate eﬃciency gains fall
sharply compared to Table 7. Without basic allowances the optimal share of ﬂat pensions
is now only 50 percent. If basic allowances are introduced, the optimal level is now 20
percent of average income and the respective ﬂat beneﬁt share is 25 percent. Note that
the eﬃciency gain of the optimal combination is reduced sharply from 2.13 percent (in
Table 7) to 0.70 percent of remaining resources.
Of course, if we combine low risk aversion and high labor supply elasticities, the eﬃciency
8In an attempt to extract the degree of relative risk aversion from hypothetical questions administered
to a sample of respondents in the Health and Retirement Survey, Barsky et al. (1997) ﬁnd evidence that
a substantial proportion of people is much more risk averse.
20Tabelle 8: Compensated welfare changes: Sensitivity analysis∗
γρ η β λ
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
0.25 0.6 4.0 0.0 0.00 0.30 0.55 0.63 0.64
0.1 1.15 1.37 1.55 1.55 1.52
0.2 2.21 2.42 2.59 2.52 2.39
0.3 2.69 2.84 2.87 2.59 2.37
0.4 2.55 2.47 2.29 1.99 1.67
0.5 0.7 4.0 0.0 0.00 0.43 0.60 0.72 0.83
0.1 0.54 0.87 1.05 1.09 0.95
0.2 1.09 1.32 1.41 1.28 0.88
0.3 1.26 1.22 1.22 1.03 0.73
0.4 1.09 0.94 0.77 0.08 -0.55
0.5 0.6 2.0 0.0 0.00 0.10 0.17 0.07 -0.16
0.1 0.32 0.42 0.42 0.20 -0.04
0.2 0.66 0.70 0.51 0.22 -0.01
0.3 0.68 0.59 0.39 0.12 -0.37
0.4 0.47 0.21 -0.12 -0.70 -1.35
∗In percentage of remaining resources.
gains will fall further. For the combination η =2 .0a n dρ =0 .7 the optimal progressivity
parameters would be β =0 .2,λ =0 .0 and the aggregate eﬃciency gain would fall to
0.42 percent of resources. We also simulated the optimal benchmark reform of Table
7 in a small open economy. Without factor price repercussions the aggregate eﬃciency
gains slightly increase from 2.13 to 2.32 percent, but the basic intuition does not change.
Finally, we have ﬁxed the consumption tax rate and introduced a payroll tax in order
to balance the budget. Due to the annual net-income adjustment of the actual pension
amount the pension level falls now compared to the benchmark reforms. The compensated
and uncompensated welfare changes, however, are hardly aﬀected.
6 Conclusion
The present paper develops a pure welfare theoretic argument in favor of widely used pro-
gressive pension arrangements. Simulating the switch from the current purely contribution-
related system towards a more progressive pension system in Germany, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant
eﬃciency gains. For our benchmark calibration the latter amount to more than 2 percent
of aggregate resources. The eﬃciency gains are due to a (positive) insurance eﬀect, a
(positive) liquidity eﬀect and a (negative) labor supply eﬀect which are isolated in the
21numerical simulations. For our benchmark calibration we ﬁnd an optimal ﬂat beneﬁt
share in overall pension beneﬁts of 50 percent and an optimal basic allowance of 30 per-
cent of average income. Of course, the optimal progressivity is sensitive to the assumed
parameter speciﬁcation but as long as households are reasonable risk averse we always
ﬁnd a signiﬁcant aggregate eﬃciency gain when moving to a more progressive system.
Our distributional analysis also yields some evidence why the proposed reform has not
been implemented despite the potential Pareto-improvement. Even for the most favorable
parameter combination considered, such a reform would not ﬁnd political support in the
initial population. The retirees and many middle aged would lose, only younger workers
would beneﬁt.
Of course, the present framework could be extended in various other directions. In future
work we plan to analyze three speciﬁc extensions. First, we will keep the current tax-
beneﬁt linkage but reduce the level of the unfunded pension system. Since our model
abstracts from annuity markets, the public pension system acts as a substitute for an
annuity insurance. Reducing the level of the pay-as-you-go system might therefore reduce
eﬃciency. Second, we plan to look closer at the interaction between the tax and the public
pension system. More speciﬁcally, we would like to know how the optimal progressivity of
the pension system changes, when we alter the progressivity of the income tax. Finally,
we plan to introduce the social assistance system in Germany. The latter will probably
reduce the eﬃciency gains from the improved intragenerational risk sharing in the present
model. However, a means-tested basic income guarantee could not act as a substitute for
a progressive pension system, since the insurance eﬀect of the former only applies to a
small group of agents.
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